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AMERICAN TRUCKING v. PORT OF LOS 
ANGELES: IS THE CASTLE DOCTRINE  
A TICKING TIME BOMB, POTENTIALLY 
ELIMINATING PORTS’ CONTROL OF 
CARGO TRUCKING? 
KATHERINE B. PUCCIO* 
Abstract: As the Port of Los Angeles and the shipping industry continue to ex-
pand, states struggle to regulate the heavy trucking businesses that support the 
shipping companies. In American Trucking Assn’s, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the 
Supreme Court struck down as preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration 
Authorization Act of 1994 parts of a Concession Agreement that sought to regu-
late the relationship between these trucking companies and the Port. The Court 
declined to decide a second question of whether the Port could punish trucking 
companies that routinely fail to comply with regulations. This Comment argues 
that the FAAAA’s broad preemption has left states unable to regulate the heavy 
trucking industry properly. Considering this deficiency, Congress or the EPA 
must step in to control the industry and prevent it from further polluting the envi-
ronment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Established in 1907, the Port of Los Angeles Long Warf (“Port”) spans 
forty-three miles of waterfront and occupies 7,500 acres on the California 
coast.1 It is the busiest container port in the United States2 and the sixteenth 
busiest in the world.3 The Port processed 7.94 million twenty-foot equivalent 
units (TEUs)4 in 2011 and 8.1 million TEUs in 2012.5 This massive shipping 
volume comes at an environmental cost: the Los Angeles metropolitan area has 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 NO NET INCREASE TASK FORCE, REPORT TO MAYOR HAHN AND COUNCILWOMAN HAHN 1-1 
(2005), available at http://www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/REPORT_NNI_Final.pdf and http://perma.
cc/4F4Y-HCDY; see also PORT OF L.A., FACTS AND FIGURES 1 (2013), available at http://www.
portoflosangeles.org/pdf/POLA_Facts_and_Figures_Card.pdf and http://perma.cc/7ZBW-MGRF. 
 2 PORT OF L.A., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 9 (2012), available at http://
www.portoflosangeles.org/Publications/Financial_Statement_2012.pdf and http://perma.cc/MJ6N-
AHT3. 
 3 PORT OF L.A., supra note 1, at 1. 
 4 NO NET INCREASE TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 1-13. TEUs are the standard metric used in the 
container industry. Id. at 1-13 n.i. 
 5 PORT OF L.A., supra note 2, at 9. 
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the worst ozone pollution and fourth worst particulate pollution in the country.6 
The cancer risk from diesel pollution is sixty percent higher in communities in 
the South Coast Air Basin, where the Port is located, than it is elsewhere in 
California.7 
Neighborhoods and businesses near the Port have long been concerned 
about the Port’s activities and the persistent traffic and noise.8 In an effort to 
address these concerns, the Board of Harbor Commissioners, the municipal 
division that runs the Port,9 attempted to require drayage trucking companies10 
to adhere to a mandatory Concession Agreement11 as part of the Port’s Clean 
Air Action Plan (CAAP).12 From 2005 to 2010, there was a 92% reduction in 
sulfur oxides, an 89% reduction in diesel particulate matter, and a 77% reduc-
                                                                                                                           
 6 Most Polluted Cities, AM. LUNG ASS’N, http://www.stateoftheair.org/2013/city-rankings/most-
polluted-cities.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/8D69-HCAD. 
 7 NO NET INCREASE TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 2-1. 
 8 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. App. 4th 268, 279 (2002). 
 9 Meet the Los Angeles Board of Harbor Commissioners, PORT OF L.A., http://www.portof
losangeles.org/commission/harbor_commissioners.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/KU6M-ERMH. The Board of Harbor Commissioners is a five-member board appoint-
ed by the mayor of Los Angeles and confirmed by the Los Angeles City Council. Id. The commission-
ers serve five-year terms. Id. 
 10 The Port defines drayage trucks in the following manner: 
 [A]ny in-use On-Road Vehicle with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating greater than 
14,000 pounds that pulls a trailer or chassis used for transporting cargo (such as con-
tainerized, bulk, or break-bulk goods), operatingon or transgressing through Port Prop-
erty for the purpose of loading, unloading or transporting cargo, empty containers or 
chassis that originated from or is destined for Port Property. Drayage Truck does not in-
clude Dedicated Use Vehicles, Authorized Emergency Vehicles, Military Tactical Sup-
port Vehicles, Yard Trucks or (A) vehicles transporting cargoes that originated from 
Port Property but have been off-loaded from the equipment (e.g., a trailer, chassis or 
container) that transported the cargo from Port Property; or (B) vehicles transporting 
cargoes destined for Port Property that are to be subsequently transferred into or onto 
different equipment (e.g., a trailer, chassis or container) before being delivered to Port 
Property. 
PORT OF L.A., TARIFF NO. 4, § 20, 184 (Jan. 10, 2013), available at http://www.portoflosangeles.
org/Tariff/SEC20.pdf and http://perma.cc/H9WV-PUPT. 
 11 A Concession Agreement, or a Concession, is “a written agreement between the Port of Los 
Angeles and a Licensed Motor Carrier to allow Drayage Truck access to a Port of Los Angeles Termi-
nal for drayage services under terms and conditions set forth therein.” PORT OF L.A., TARIFF NO. 4, 
§ 20, 183 (June 26, 2011). 
 12 Press Release, The Port of Los Angeles, New Year’s Day Marks End of Dirty Trucks for Port of 
Los Angeles Clean Truck Program: 100 Percent of Containers In and Out of Port Terminals Now 
Hauled by Clean Trucks (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.portoflosangeles.org/newsroom/
2011_releases/news_122011_clean_truck.asp and http://perma.cc/48W8-EWZ2. The CAAP has sev-
eral components, including a Clean Truck Program. Id. The Concession Agreement is a part of the 
Clean Truck Program. Id. 
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tion in nitrogen oxides, which are the three primary pollutants associated with 
the development of smog. 13 
In 2008, the American Trucking Associations (ATA), the largest national 
trade association representing the trucking industry, challenged the legality of 
the Concession Agreement and argued that it violated the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution and the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization 
Act of 1994 (FAAAA), and discriminated against the right of drayage compa-
nies to engage in interstate commerce.14 After five years of litigation, the U.S. 
Supreme Court left the Clean Truck Program mostly intact.15 In American 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the Court declared that the 
FAAAA preempted two minor provisions of the Concession Agreement that 
would have required the drayage trucking companies operating at the Port to 
list off-site parking information for trucks and to display a safety placard on 
the back of every vehicle.16 The Court then deemed premature the question of 
whether the Court’s 1954 decision in Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.17 
barred the Port from banning trucking companies from its facilities entirely for 
violations of other provisions of the Concession Agreement.18 
This Comment argues that the broad preemption provisions of the 
FAAAA have created a regulatory void that only Congress can fill.19 With 
states and other municipal entities unable to prevent pollution-spewing trucks 
from travelling through their borders, the EPA must step in to create an en-
forcement scheme that severely punishes motor carriers that continually violate 
environmental regulations.20 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Port leases its facilities to Marine Terminal Operators.21 The Port is 
financed not by tax dollars but by revenues it earns in the marketplace.22 
                                                                                                                           
 13 PORT OF L.A., AIR QUALITY REPORT CARD 2005–2010 (2011), available at http://www.
portoflosangeles.org/pdf/2010_Air_Quality_Report_Card.pdf and http://perma.cc/H6NX-VGZC. 
 14 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115–16 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008), rev’d, 559 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2009). The Clean Truck Program is a significant part of the 
CAAP, which targets major sources of air pollution and emissions at the Ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach. Id. at 1114–15. It includes a progressive ban on polluting trucks, facilitates the replace-
ment of old trucks with low-emission vehicles, and requires adherence to a detailed Concession 
Agreement. Id. 
 15 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2097–99 (2013). 
 16 Id. at 2099. 
 17 348 U.S. 61 (1954). 
 18 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct. at 2099. 
 19 See infra notes 73–101 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 73–101 and accompanying text. 
 21 Terminal operators enter into contracts with short-haul trucks, also called “drayage trucks,” to 
transport cargo in and out of the Port. PORT OF L.A., TARIFF NO. 4, § 20, 184C (Jun. 26, 2011). 
 22 Operating revenue for fiscal year 2012 was $409.8 million. PORT OF L.A., supra note 2, at 10. 
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Around 1997, the Port created plans to enlarge its facilities to attract more in-
ternational business.23 Supported by the National Environmental Defense 
Council, the surrounding neighborhood objected to the proposed expansion 
and sued in California state court.24 After an almost ten-year delay of the ex-
pansion, the Board of Harbor Commissioners implemented the CAAP in 2007 
to address some of the concerns of the neighborhood and allow the project to 
move forward.25 The Clean Truck Program is a subprogram of the CAAP that 
is “designed to reduce emissions form the heavy duty trucks involved in port 
drayage to improve the health of the people living in the communities sur-
rounding the [Port].”26 The Clean Truck Program contains the Concession 
Agreement that governs the relationship between the Port and any drayage 
trucking company that seeks to use the Port’s premises.27 Only trucking com-
panies that agree to the various requirements in the Concession Agreement are 
allowed access to the Port.28 
To ensure that drayage companies would sign the Concession Agreement, 
the Board amended the Port’s Tariff29 to provide that “no Terminal Operator 
shall permit access into any Terminal in the Port of Los Angeles to any Dray-
age Truck unless such Drayage Truck is registered under a Concession 
[Agreement].”30 Any operator entering the Port with an unregistered truck 
could be charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $500 or six 
months in prison.31 The Agreement detailed penalties for “Minor” and “Major” 
Defaults, though it did not define the difference between the two.32 If a com-
pany committed a Minor Default, the Port could issue a warning letter, require 
the company to take corrective action, require the completion of a course of 
training, or require the payment of the costs of the Port’s investigation.33 In the 
event of a Major Default, the Port could suspend or revoke the company’s right 
to provide drayage services at the Port.34 As of March 2013, “the Port has nev-
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 660 F.3d 384, 391 (9th Cir. 2011); Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, 103 Cal. App. 4th at 268. 
 24 See Natural Res. Def. Council, 103 Cal. App. 4th at 268. 
 25 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 660 F.3d at 392. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct. at 2100. 
 28 See id. 
 29 The Port of Los Angeles Tariff describes the rates, charges, rules, and regulations of the Port, 
including information about pilotage, dockage, wharfage, passengers, free time, wharf demurrage, 
wharf space assignments, cranes, and other operational rules and regulations. PORT OF L.A., TARIFF 
NO. 4, § 1, 13 (Jul. 1, 1990), available at http://www.portoflosangeles.org/Tariff/SEC01.pdf and http://
perma.cc/7BQS-LHT4. 
 30 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct. at 2100. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
84 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41 E. Supp.80 
er suspended or revoked a trucking company’s license to operate at the Port for 
a prior violation.”35 
In July 2008, the ATA sued in the U.S. District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California and sought a preliminary injunction to block implementation 
of the Agreement.36 The ATA alleged that § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA37 
preempted the Concession Agreement requirements.38 The District Court de-
nied the preliminary injunction and held that the Port could implement the 
Agreement as a safety measure, an exemption to the FAAAA.39 On appeal, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.40 On re-
mand, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the Agree-
ment’s employee driver, parking, and financial capability provisions, but not 
the placard and maintenance provisions.41 The ATA appealed, but the Ninth 
Circuit reversed only regarding the placard provision.42 On remand, the Dis-
trict Court ruled that the provisions were not preempted by the FAAAA and 
entered an injunction in part pending appeal.43 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for fur-
ther consideration.44 The Ninth Circuit found that the Port “directly participat-
ed in the market,” and the Concession Agreement was simply an ordinary con-
tract under which the Port “exchanges access to its property for a drayage car-
rier’s compliance with certain conditions.”45 The placard provision and em-
ployee driver provision were preempted, whereas the off-street parking provi-
sion, maintenance provision, and financial capability provision were saved.46 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. 
 36 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. Initially, there were five provisions of the Con-
cession Agreement at issue: (1) Provision III(d), requiring trucking companies to use employee drivers 
rather than independent owner-operators; (2) Provision III(f), requiring companies to submit off-street 
parking locations for all permitted trucks; (3) Provision III(g), requiring companies to ensure that 
maintenance of all permitted trucks is in accordance with manufacturers’ instructions; (4) Provision 
III(l), requiring all permitted trucks to have safety placards with a phone number for reporting con-
cerns while on the Port’s grounds; and (5) Provision III(n), requiring companies to demonstrate to the 
executive director of the Board that they are financially capable of complying with all Concession 
Agreement provisions. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 660 F.3d at 394; Natural Res. Def. Council, 103 Cal. 
App. 4th at 268. 
 37 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2006). 
 38 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 660 F.3d at 390. 
 39 Id. at 394. 
 40 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 559 F.2d at 1061. 
 41 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion on Remand for Entry of Prelimi-
nary Injunction of Counts I and II of Complaint, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (No. CV 
08-4920 CAS (CTx)), 2009 WL 1160212, at *20–22. 
 42 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 596 F.3d 602, 606–07 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 43 Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 
(No. CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx)), 2010 WL 4313973, at *1, *4. 
 44 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 660 F.3d at 409–10; Natural Res. Def. Council, 103 Cal. App. 4th at 268. 
 45 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 660 F.3d at 400. 
 46 Id. 
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the ATA’s claim that Castle barred the 
Port from applying the penalty clause to forbid a company from operating at 
the facility and instead found that limiting access to the Port would not restrict 
carriers from generally participating in interstate commerce.47 
The ATA appealed the placard and off-street parking rulings to the Su-
preme Court.48 It also appealed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that Castle did not 
bar the Port from applying the penalty parts of the Concession Agreement in 
their entirety.49 In American Trucking Assn’s, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the 
Supreme Court found that the placard and parking provisions were preempted 
by the FAAAA.50 The Supreme Court declined to decide whether the Port’s 
entire enforcement scheme, which could result in a drayage truck company’s 
complete exclusion, violated Castle.51 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act 
(FAAAA) in 1994 to prevent states from undermining federal deregulation of 
the interstate trucking industry.52 The FAAAA has been the subject of dozens 
of cases since that time.53 The FAAAA provides that as a general rule, “a State 
[or] political subdivision of a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regula-
tion, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, 
route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of 
property.”54 
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 
Inc. that Illinois could not suspend the right of an interstate motor carrier to use 
Illinois highways for interstate transportation of goods.55 An Illinois statute 
limited the weight of freight that could be carried by commercial trucks on 
Illinois highways.56 Repeated violations of the weight limits were punishable 
by total suspension of the carrier’s right to use Illinois state highways for a 
significant period of time.57 The Court was not persuaded that other enforce-
                                                                                                                           
 47 See id. at 403. “While a denial of access to the Port may have more effect on motor carriers 
than a traditional fine, it does not rise to the level of the comprehensive ban at issue in Castle.” Id. 
 48 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct. at 2100–01. 
 49 See id. at 2099. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 368 (2008); Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, 
219 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 53 See, e.g., Rowe, 552 U.S. at 368; Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1048; see also James Lockhard, Annota-
tion, Preemptive Effect of Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 14501(c), 41713(b)(4), 29 A.L.R. FED. 2d 563 (2008). 
 54 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2006). 
 55 348 U.S. 61, 65 (1954). 
 56 Id. at 62. 
 57 Id. 
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ment mechanisms might not achieve the same goal of preventing overloaded 
trucks from traveling on Illinois highways, and it noted there were convention-
al forms of punishment available to Illinois.58 Additionally, the federal Inter-
state Commerce Commission could revoke the certificates of motor carriers 
that willfully refused to comply with any lawful regulation it set forth, or if a 
carrier repeatedly violated the laws of any of the states.59 
Similarly, in Railroad Transfer Service, Inc. v. City of Chicago, the Su-
preme Court struck down a Chicago licensing scheme for transfer car operators 
and held that the scheme constituted an illegal “veto power” over the exercise 
of interstate commerce.60 Similar in some aspects to the Port of Los Angeles, 
Chicago required operators to pay a licensing fee, hire only Chicago residents 
as drivers, maintain the financial ability to render an enjoyable and safe ser-
vice, and to replace and maintain all equipment.61 The City sought to enforce 
the requirements by denial of an operating license and then criminal sanctions 
for operation without a license.62 Finding a violation of the Interstate Com-
merce Act because of the “veto power” held by Chicago, the Supreme Court 
declared the entire scheme void.63 
Contrastingly, in Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, the Su-
preme Court in 1933 held that Ohio’s denial of a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity to a motor carrier to operate on one state highway did not 
exclude the motor carrier from operation in interstate commerce.64 The Court 
acknowledged that states may exclude motor carriers engaged in interstate 
commerce from public highways if necessary to promote public safety.65 Not-
ing that there were adequate alternative routes available to the motor carriers, 
the Court declared that the denial was not a violation of the carrier’s right to 
engage in interstate commerce.66 
In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, the Supreme Court in 
2008 explicitly rejected the premise that there was a public health exception to 
the FAAAA.67 Noting that the FAAAA lists a set of explicit exceptions and 
that public health was not one of them, the Court struck down certain provi-
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. at 64. 
 59 Id. at 65. 
 60 386 U.S. 351, 360 (1958) (quoting City of Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
357 U.S. 77, 85 (1958)). Transfer business, under contract with railroads, transported thousands of 
interstate railroad passengers between Chicago’s various rail terminals. Id. at 352. 
 61 Id. at 353–54. 
 62 Id. at 360. 
 63 See id. at 358–60 (quoting Atchison, 357 U.S. at 85). 
 64 289 U.S. 92, 94 (1933). 
 65 Id. at 96. 
 66 Id. at 94. 
 67 552 U.S. 364, 374 (2008). 
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sions of Maine’s Tobacco Delivery Law as preempted.68 The Court empha-
sized it is difficult to define “public health” because there are many products 
that create “public health risks” of varying kinds and degrees, and there are 
differing opinions about what constitutes risk.69 Allowing Maine to regulate 
motor carriers directly could have resulted in a patchwork system of state mo-
tor carrier regulations made in the name of public health.70 The Court then in-
dicated that Congress was unlikely to have intended an “implicit general public 
health exception” to the FAAAA.71 
III. ANALYSIS 
In American Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to answer two questions: (1) whether § 14501(c)(1) of 
the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempted 
the Port of Los Angeles’s (“Port”) Concession Agreement’s (“Agreement”) 
placard and parking provisions, and (2) whether Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 
Inc. precluded reliance on the Agreement’s penalty clause to suspend or revoke 
a trucking company’s privileges after a violation of the Agreement had been 
cured.72 
Recognizing that § 14501(c)(1) draws a “rough line” between the exercise 
of regulatory authority and contract-based market participation, the Court em-
phasized that the Port could act both as a private party and as a market regula-
tor.73 Nonetheless, the Court found the placard and parking provisions were 
preempted and held that the Port was not acting in a way that any owner of an 
ordinary business could mimic.74 According to the Court, by forcing terminal 
operators to sign the Agreement under threat of criminal penalties, the Port was 
performing its “prototypical regulatory role.”75 It exerted “classic regulatory 
authority” in imposing the placard and parking requirements and created a 
government program that included criminal sanctions and had “coercive pow-
er” over private enterprises.76 The Court held that the Port may not force any 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at 374, 377. Maine adopted “An Act to Regulate the Delivery and Sales of Tobacco Prod-
ucts and to Prevent the Sale of Tobacco Products to Minors” in 2003. Id at 368. One portion of the Act 
prevented anyone other than a Maine-licensed tobacco retailer to accept an order of tobacco. 22 ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C (2013). Another part forbade any person “knowingly” to “transport” 
a “tobacco product” to “a person” in Maine unless either the sender or the receiver has a Maine li-
cense. Id. § 1555-D; see also Rowe, 552 U.S. at 369. 
 69 Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375. 
 70 See id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (2013). 
 73 Id. at 2102–03. 
 74 Id. at 2099, 2103. 
 75 Id. at 2103. 
 76 Id. 
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private party to alter its behavior through criminal sanctions punishable by 
time in prison.77 
The Court did not answer the second question, namely whether the Port’s 
entire enforcement scheme involves curtailing drayage trucks’ operations in a 
way that Castle prohibits.78 Justice Kagan noted that Castle places limits on 
how a state or locality can punish interstate motor carriers for prior violations 
of trucking regulations, but a state may take a vehicle off the road that is pres-
ently out of compliance with the same regulations.79 The Port emphasized that 
it did not claim the authority to punish past violations and that it has never 
used its suspension or revocation power to penalize a past violation.80 Given 
the pre-enforcement posture of the issue, the Court declined to issue a ruling.81 
Congress intended the FAAAA to prevent the states from imposing their 
own regulations on motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce.82 The 
FAAAA’s preemption language, in conjunction with Castle and its progeny, 
prevents states from enacting certain kinds of environmental and public health 
regulations.83 A safety regulation that targets interstate motor carriers, such as 
one that deals with hazardous cargo, may also have a positive effect on the en-
vironment.84 By its nature as a safety regulation, it would likely be saved from 
preemption under the FAAAA.85 In contrast, an environmental regulation of 
motor carriers that is designed to protect the public health that cannot other-
wise be classified as a safety regulation would most likely be struck down as 
preempted by the FAAAA.86 
Barring access to the Port is analogous to barring a motor carrier from the 
highways of an entire state.87 There are only 200 private ports and 150 public 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 2105. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008); Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, 
219 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 83 See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2006) (“[A] State [or] political subdivision of a State . . . may not 
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a 
price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”); Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct. at 2096. 
 84 See Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 
(1999); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1994—Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act 
of 1994, Public L. No. 103-311, 108 Stat. 1673 (1994). 
 85 See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) (stating that the preemption provisions in the Act “shall not 
restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles . . .”). 
 86 See Rowe, 552 U.S. at 374. 
 87 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct. at 2105. 
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ports in the United States.88 Because the Port is the largest container port in the 
United States by container volume and the sixteenth busiest internationally, 
preventing a drayage trucking company from accessing the Port has the same 
devastating effect as preventing access to an entire state.89 In this way, the 
Port’s enforcement scheme is distinguishable from the scheme in Bradley v. 
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.90 Banning a motor carrier from one route 
when there are a variety available is not the same as banning a company from 
the largest Port in the nation.91 
The ban in Castle did not completely prohibit incompliant motor carriers 
from participating in interstate commerce or eliminate all access to connecting 
links.92 Instead, the ban merely “partially suspended” the motor carrier’s fed-
erally-granted permit to travel interstate and “seriously disrupted” rather than 
eliminated entirely the motor carriers’ ability to carry goods through Illinois.93 
Barring access to the Port would “seriously disrupt” a drayage carrier’s ability 
to transport goods in interstate commerce.94 The regulatory scheme initially 
established through the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 has been altered through 
multiple trucking deregulation statutes, including the FAAAA, but the basic 
premise that states do not have veto power over interstate commerce service 
providers remains.95 There exists a regulatory scheme governing interstate 
transport, and the federal government continues to issue registrations or per-
mits enabling trucking companies to transport cargo interstate, provided that 
they are in compliance with federal safety and insurance regulations.96 
Similarly, Railroad Transfer Service, Inc. v. City of Chicago deprives 
states and localities of the right to have “veto power” over the exercise of in-
terstate commerce.97 The licensing scheme at issue in Railroad Transfer is ex-
tremely similar to the Concession Agreement in American Trucking.98 While 
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the Port in American Trucking claimed that “something egregious would have 
to happen” for it to ban a drayage trucking company from its premises for past 
violations, allowing the Port to have this power at all is the kind of veto power 
that Railroad Transfer is designed to prevent.99 In the face of this broad 
preemption scheme, the EPA should step in to regulate the trucking industry 
more heavily.100 
CONCLUSION 
In passing the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act 
(FAAAA), Congress sought a uniform regulation of the trucking industry in-
stead of a piecemeal system that could interfere with interstate commerce. Alt-
hough the U.S. Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on the Castle v. Hayes 
Freight Lines, Inc. question in American Trucking Assn’s, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, there are limits on how a state or local entity can punish an interstate 
motor carrier for violations of trucking regulations. There is nothing that can 
prevent a state or local entity such as the Port of Los Angeles from taking off 
the road a vehicle that is contemporaneously out of compliance with Port regu-
lations, but it may not ban a truck for any period longer than it takes to cure the 
violation. With states restricted in their ability to prevent pollution by trucking 
companies as a result of Castle and American Trucking, the federal govern-
ment should step in to pursue an aggressive regulatory agenda to ensure com-
pliance with environmental regulations. 
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